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ince winning the Governor General’s Award in 1958, Colin 
McDougall’s only novel, Execution, has been neglected, despite 
the richness of a text that provides ample critical avenues into 
Canadian war literature. Peter Webb calls the novel the “only mas-
terpiece among Canadian Second World War novels” (163). Dagmar 
Novak praises Execution as “arguably the best Canadian novel about the 
Second World War” (112). Yet little has been made of the novel’s com-
plicated representation of wartime ethics. Even less has been made of its 
existential underpinnings. In the novel, Padre Doorn, a military pastor, 
comes face to face with a quintessential existential realization: “The 
Padre stared unremittingly at the sky, waiting for the parley to open — 
and nothing happened. Nothing except air burst” (145). Furthermore, 
McDougall’s allusions to existentialists like Franz Kafka seem to indi-
cate that he wished Execution to be read within the complex and mul-
tifaceted tradition of existential fiction. The novel’s ending, however, 
which features a proxy crucifixion, complicates this interpretation since 
novels within that tradition, such as Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea (1938) or 
Albert Camus’s The Stranger (1942), do not typically allow for any kind 
of spiritual transcendence. Understanding this seemingly irreconcilable 
tension means eschewing the dominant form of mid-century existential-
ism characterized by Sartre and Camus in favour of one of existential-
ism’s foundational figures. A close reading of Execution, considering the 
formative texts of existentialism and a comparative reading of works by 
its international inf luences, including Kafka, Herman Melville, and 
William Faulkner, reveals a valuable theoretical matrix for parsing the 
difficult philosophy of this neglected novel. For Execution accords with 
an earlier form of existentialism, one that predates the school’s consen-
sus atheism and is articulated primarily by Søren Kierkegaard in Fear 
and Trembling.
Twentieth-century existentialism is difficult to elucidate. A loose 
conglomeration of perspectives, aesthetics, and approaches to dealing 
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with the world and its inherent difficulties, existentialism deals, in the 
most general sense, with the recurring problem of finding meaning 
in existence. War novels, with their themes of absurdity, meaningless-
ness, and despair, represent a distinctive form of existentialism, even 
though early examples of existential war fiction precede the introduction 
of post-Second World War French existentialism embodied by Sartre, 
Camus, and Beauvoir. As “existence precedes essence,” so the writers of 
war fiction precede the French existential philosophers.
In the Canadian critical imagination, novels about the First World 
War have far outperformed novels of the Second World War. Timothy 
Findley’s The Wars (1977), Jane Urquhart’s The Stone Carvers (2001), 
and Joseph Boyden’s Three Day Road (2001) all are prominent in aca-
demic and popular discussions. Curiously, no novel about the Second 
World War holds an equivalent position. This imbalance only further 
cements the First World War’s reputation as “Canada’s war.” The narra-
tive of the First World War as Canada’s de facto war of independence is 
still a compelling one. The Second World War, with its accompanying 
racist policies against Japanese Canadians and conscription controversy, 
is harder for authors and critics to pin down. Although some Second 
World War novels were well received in their day — G.H. Sallans’s Little 
Man (1942), David Walker’s The Pillar (1952), and Lionel Shapiro’s The 
Sixth of June (1955) all won the Governor General’s Award for fiction 
— most have been largely forgotten by critics and the reading public.
Few critics lament the loss to history of these novels. For Webb, “all 
of these authors write with a self-conscious masculinity that is overbear-
ing and has caused them to date badly” (160). The First and Second 
World Wars were, of course, not the same, and soldier-novelists did not 
represent them in the same manner. While First World War novels are 
most often characterized by outrage and cynicism, Canadian novels of 
the Second World War are, according to Novak, “curiously detached” 
(95). In his First World War novel, Generals Die in Bed (1929), Charles 
Yale Harrison, for example, depicts war as the complete nullification of 
the individual: “Out on rest we behaved like human beings; here we are 
merely soldiers” (49). Execution, on the other hand, embeds a plea for 
personal responsibility not often found in novels about the First World 
War. Like the “cannon fodder” of Generals Die in Bed, the soldiers of 
Canadian Second World War fiction see themselves as insignificant 
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pawns trapped in a cycle of mechanized violence, but, in Execution, the 
possibility for personal redemption does return.
Execution focuses on a group of young Canadian soldiers during 
the Italian Campaign of the Second World War and is bookended by 
two executions. Early in the novel, as they make their way toward the 
Hitler Line, the Canadian 2nd Rifles take on two harmless Italian desert-
ers to cook for them, despite the order of the platoon’s commanding 
officer, Brigadier General Kildare, that all deserters be shot on sight. 
When Kildare discovers this insubordination, he insists that the men be 
executed. The two main characters, John Adam and Padre Doorn, must 
“acquiesce” to the execution, prompting an identity crisis for both men. 
Adam tries to forget his sin by becoming a hyper-competent soldier but 
is unable to fill the “aching emptiness inside himself” (49). Doorn has 
a nervous breakdown and becomes obsessed with finding pieces of the 
True Cross in his attempt to grasp authentic Christianity. Later a mem-
ber of the company, the cognitively challenged but good-hearted Jones, 
is arrested as the scapegoat for the murder of an American soldier and, 
due to political pressure, sentenced to death. Adam and Doorn see this 
as an opportunity to redeem themselves for their previous crime. While 
their attempts to free Jones are unsuccessful, this new killing somehow 
atones for the first, and Execution ends on a note of optimism.
The ending may seem confounding given Execution’s allusions to 
existential works. These works typically postulate that the absence of a 
transcendent force in the universe results in absolute freedom because 
the individual is entirely responsible for his or her own actions; it is the 
individual’s responsibility to create an ethos outside of societal or reli-
gious constructs. As Sartre writes, “Man is nothing else but which he 
makes of himself” (291). For Steve Lukits, Execution’s ending “strains 
its credulity” because it “provides a melodramatic answer to the char-
acter’s moral despair” (80). Lukits is unable to reconcile “Jones’ calm 
acceptance of his sacrificial role” with the novel’s earlier and more real-
istic scenes of violence and accountability (80). Lukits’s concerns get at 
the most difficult question about the novel — why does Execution, an 
existential novel seemingly marked by the absence of God, end with a 
de facto crucifixion?
When read in the context of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 
Execution’s central philosophical tension — between the opposing 
forces of existentialism and Christianity — is easier to reconcile. As 
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intimated before, existentialism is not a wholly coherent philosophy. 
Walter Kaufmann argues that existentialism is not a philosophy at all 
“but a label for several widely different revolts against traditional phi-
losophy. . . . Existentialism is not a school of thought nor reducible 
to any set of tenets” (11). This suggests not only that existentialism is 
contrarian by nature but also that its many opposing worldviews can 
exist under the same umbrella. Execution, then, can productively be 
read using the major premises of Kierkegaard’s Christian existential-
ism. Indeed, McDougall’s depiction of Padre Doorn’s quest for the True 
Cross, as well as the execution of Jones, takes on new meaning when 
read in tandem with the religious existential philosophy espoused in 
Fear and Trembling.
McDougall does not reference Kierkegaard in the novel itself in 
the same way he does Kafka; however, an examination of the Colin 
McDougall Archive, housed in the McGill Rare Books Special 
Collections Department, helps to establish a link between the Canadian 
veteran and the melancholy Dane. The “archive,” really just a battered 
banker’s box haphazardly stuffed with notes, some letters, and a note-
book, sheds significant light on McDougall’s efforts to transmute his 
own war experience onto the page. The notebook spans the five-to-six-
year time period it took him to complete the novel. Described initially 
as “a running record of the battle to [write],” the notebook became a 
vehicle for McDougall’s fears, insecurities, and everyday neuroses as 
well as a meditation on the particular difficulties of writing a war novel 
(Notebook 16/05/53). McDougall wrote in 1952 that he hoped that 
writing the novel would result in a “purging of the whole war experi-
ence” (Loose-Leaf Notes). During a bout of writer’s block, he expressed 
his desire to “settle on all the unbearably sad, aching, tender things I 
want to say about war, men at war, and write them down” (Notebook 
11/04/53). His exploration of his unpredictable state of mind stands in 
sharp contrast to the notebook itself, which is organized with military 
precision. Between late 1954 and early 1956, however, he stopped writ-
ing in the notebook altogether, with no explanation.
Littered with famous names like Evelyn Waugh, William Faulkner, 
and Herman Melville, the notebook reveals that, while conceiving and 
composing Execution, McDougall was reading texts that explicitly deal 
with themes of Christian sacrifice. Although Waugh’s paeans to glory, 
like much of his Sword of Honour trilogy, are satirized in the novel’s 
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opening sections, it is Faulkner and Melville who are most themati-
cally present in Execution. Jones has an obvious analogue in Faulkner’s 
Benjy from The Sound and the Fury. Both are cognitively challenged, 
and both take on allegorical Christ-like significance. McDougall notes 
that his “intention” in writing Execution was “to be affirmative — an 
act of faith (as Faulkner)” (Preliminary Notes). McDougall was also read-
ing Melville’s Billy Budd, and the parallels between Billy’s senseless 
execution and Jones’s are obvious as well. Both executions are clear 
Christian allegories and provide the surviving characters with tran-
scendent catharsis. Both men expire with surprising calm and provide 
comfort to their executioners. Billy Budd cries out, “God bless Captain 
Vere!” (124), whereas Jones tells Adam, “Please don’t worry about me. 
I am not afraid” (259).
The affinity between these two American authors and Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy has been long established. Jamie Lorentzen devotes his book 
Sober Cannibals, Drunken Christians: Melville, Kierkegaard, and Tragic 
Optimism in Polarized Works to the shared worldview of the Moby Dick 
author and Kierkegaard, writing that their “processes inform each 
other’s works in scores of remarkable ways” (12). In his Kierkegaard 
and Faulkner, George Bedell makes a similar argument, writing that 
“Faulkner once [said] . . . ‘I am telling the same story over and over, 
which is myself and the world [and] . . . the problems of the human 
heart in conflict with itself,’ which is Faulkner’s way of talking about 
what Kierkegaard considers the religious problem” (7-8).
For Kierkegaard, the power of the author “lies on the boundary of 
the esthetic and in the direction of the religious. . . . The lifeview is 
the way out, and the story is the way” (Two Ages 14). And it is at this 
confluence of literature, ethics, and Christianity that McDougall takes 
his place with Melville, Faulkner, and Kierkegaard. Allusions to Kafka 
make it easy to characterize Execution as another atheistic and cynical 
war novel in the vein of Catch 22 (1961) or The Thin Red Line (1962). 
To do so, however, fails to incorporate the novel’s continuity with an 
earlier form of existentialism, which still allowed for the presence of a 
transcendent force and the possibility of redemption. 
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard provides four different retell-
ings of the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac in order to show that 
redemption is possible through sacrifice. For Kierkegaard, the term 
ethics has more than one meaning. In its primary sense, ethics is synony-
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mous with the Hegelian notion of prevailing social norms. Kierkegaard 
reconciles the tension between ethics and religion, embodied in the 
Abraham parable, by invoking what he calls the “teleological suspen-
sion of the ethical” (41). This teleological suspension is the proverbial 
leap of faith. Kierkegaard argues that Abraham must sacrifice Isaac “for 
God’s sake, and (in complete identity with this) for his own sake” (41). 
George Price writes, “What is at stake in the book is Abraham’s self, his 
struggle to be. . . . [He] is therefore the paradigm for every individual 
who finds himself at the frontier of ethics” (192). Kierkegaard argues 
that, in deciding to kill his son for God, Abraham is ethically wrong but 
religiously right. Much of Fear and Trembling turns on the notion that 
Abraham’s would-be sacrifice of his son Isaac is not an act performed 
for the sake of social norms but rather a duty to something higher than 
both Abraham’s social commitment not to kill an innocent person and 
his personal commitment to his son. In other words, his duty is to the 
Absolute (God) and not to the Universal (ethics). This recognition and 
the accompanying sacrifice elevate Abraham to what Kierkegaard terms 
a “Knight of Faith.” He acts not under the belief that God must always 
be obeyed but rather under the assumption that God would not ask 
Abraham to do something unethical.
It is not difficult to extrapolate Abraham’s plight to those of the 
Canadian soldiers in Execution. They must, at great personal expense, 
acquiesce to senseless violence for the sake of the “universal” ethic, at 
the behest of powerful forces like the military, nationalism, and bureau-
cracy. The mechanized approach to death characteristic of the wars of 
the twentieth century meant that soldiers had to justify their actions in 
a unique ethical context, a context difficult to duplicate in civilian life. 
Within this paradigm, Adam, Doorn, and the other members of the 
company must themselves become Knights of Faith and find a way to 
assert that they remain ethical beings. Ultimately, Execution is a philo-
sophical meditation on what it means to act ethically under constraint. 
For Warren Cariou, “the men of McDougall’s Italian campaign are 
something like Beckett’s characters Vladimir and Estragon, except that 
they must try to find meaning not through waiting, but through obey-
ing” (273). In other words, when is killing another human being justi-
fied? In its opening lines, Execution foregrounds this difficult question 
with Krasnick’s steadfast refusal, “I ain’t gonna shoot no horses!” (3). 
Although Krasnick does not express any qualms about killing Germans, 
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he implicitly knows where to draw the ethical line. His dilemma dem-
onstrates how war alters the moral lives of otherwise good men.
The existential and ethical conf lict found in the novel may have 
been inspired by a real-life incident. The Canadian military long main-
tained that it had not executed any of its own men during the Second 
World War. On 5 July 1945, however, months after the war was over, 
twenty-three-year-old Private Harold Pringle was executed by firing 
squad for military crimes. McDougall recapitulates this true story, inte-
grating it with Kierkegaard’s particular brand of existentialism, in order 
to impose credible order on what is otherwise a chaotic and senseless act. 
In appropriating Pringle’s execution, McDougall depicts how war ren-
ders normal that which should be abhorrent. After his father’s discharge 
for poor eyesight, Pringle became a disciplinary problem, going AWOL 
several times. After the battle of the Hitler Line, which coincidentally 
is the climactic battle in Execution, Pringle likely suffered from post-
traumatic stress. He once again went AWOL to Rome, where he took up 
with a gang of small-time smugglers. The gang’s criminal success was 
short-lived due to excessive drinking and squabbling. Eventually, one 
gang member was shot dead, and the others were arrested. At the trial, 
one member testified against the rest in exchange for immunity; Pringle 
was found guilty and sentenced to death (Clark 287). Pringle’s life and 
death are examined in Andrew Clark’s A Keen Soldier: The Execution 
of Second World War Private Harold Pringle (2002). While there is no 
mention of Pringle in the McDougall papers, and it is not known how 
much McDougall heard through the military grapevine, the similarities 
between Pringle and Jones are too conspicuous to be simply coincidence. 
McDougall appears to have reworked Pringle’s story, elevating it from 
a meaningless bureaucratic tragedy into something else.
Reading Execution with Fear and Trembling evinces a coherent order 
to the violent and seemingly chaotic events. Kierkegaard argues that 
people live on three planes of existence: the aesthetic (living for one’s 
self ), the ethical (living for others), and the religious (living for God) 
(Fear and Trembling 78). Characters in Execution embody all these 
planes. Kierkegaard’s Christian existentialism, moreover, has three 
major premises. The first is his calling of the masses back to a more 
genuine form of Christianity. For Kierkegaard, the type of Christianity 
that existed in the decades following the crucifixion of Jesus Christ 
was the most pure and unadulterated form. He believed, however, that 
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by his own time the New Testament concept of love had been per-
verted. The second premise equates God and love. According to Fear 
and Trembling, to engage in the act of loving is to approach the divine. 
The final premise of Christian existentialism involves the undoing of 
evil acts (redemption). Versions of all three of Kierkegaard’s premises 
are enacted in the novel. 
Kierkegaard’s first premise, the desire to return Christianity to its 
post-crucifixion purity, is embodied by Padre Doorn’s quest for pieces 
of the True Cross, which serves as the central metaphor for Christianity 
in the novel. At the beginning, Padre Doorn firmly believes in the holy 
nature of war. The Canadian soldiers he serves with and has grown to 
love and respect are doing God’s work: “It was sacrilege to think that 
those strong young bodies, created in God’s image, might be smashed 
or maimed, flung lifeless on a Sicilian beach. In the whites of their eyes 
tonight he had seen their closeness to God; these were dedicated men, 
these were crusaders” (10). Martial language and religious language are 
indistinguishable in his early rhetoric. But he is unable to reconcile 
his early and naive vision with the horrific scene he witnesses in the 
barnyard where these “crusaders” kill two innocents; this causes a crisis 
of faith for him and, as for Adam, a crisis of self. In the novel’s second 
section, Doorn occupies a liminal space between life and death: “As for 
Padre Doorn, the man had simply become a graveyard ghoul” (49). He 
is forced to re-evaluate his entire worldview, pushing him to the brink 
of madness and launching his own existential quest.
As Doorn approaches the chapel of St. Agatha in the hope of recov-
ering bits of the True Cross, he is in a religious trance: “The Padre’s eyes 
were on fire. His gaze at the gleaming reliquary was devouring, consum-
ing, as though in glance he celebrated visual Mass” (107). The chapel 
contains what he believes he needs to save himself and, indeed, all of 
Christianity: “That reliquary held doom and salvation, life and death 
— everything. . . . Inside the case was the object marking the end of his 
search. . . . He walked into the blaze of sacramental light” (107). Yet, his 
mission accomplished, Doorn is still met with a suffocating nothingness 
as he thrusts the True Cross at the sky and God. Walking toward the 
battlefield, he makes an impassioned declaration: “No — there must be 
no more execution!” (144). This will not be the case. Doorn erroneously 
equates the gathering of aesthetic objects with sacrifice.
When read allegorically, the sacrifice of Jones takes on both New 
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and Old Testament significance. He is both Jesus and Isaac. It is no 
coincidence that Brigadier General Ian Kildare is ultimately responsible 
for both executions, ordering the first and acquiescing to the second 
due to political pressure. In the beginning, the braggart soldier, with 
his Balmoral cap (which is strictly against regulation), seems to be the 
sole bastion of individuality. He is revealed, however, to be merely an 
ambitious bureaucrat and not always the best judge of character. He 
privileges aesthetics over essence. When he meets Jones, a man who 
looks like the ideal soldier and does exactly as he is told, Kildare laughs: 
“See that? A damn fine soldier” (21). Cariou points out Kildare’s error: 
“Jones is anything but a fine soldier, precisely because he obeys every 
order unthinkingly” (274). His total lack of self-awareness means that 
he is one of the few characters in the novel not suffering an existential 
crisis.
Major Bazin, the novel’s most explicitly existential character, is not 
so lucky. His cynical worldview is confirmed when he takes a position 
as a military prison guard. Adam describes Bazin as being “grotesquely 
misemployed” in this endeavour. Bazin agrees with this characteriza-
tion, describing the prison as “purest Kafka”: “To myself I call it Der 
Strafekolonie [sic], and I recognize, of course, that I am the principal 
prisoner. . . . I have at last, you see, found my vocation in life: I am 
commandant of a Field Punishment Camp. I have a Sergeant descended 
from Captain Bligh, and an Adjutant straight out of Stendhal” (152). 
The reference to Kafka serves as another example of the connec-
tion between Execution and Fear and Trembling. Kafka’s “In the Penal 
Colony” revolves around the final use of an elaborate torture and exe-
cution machine that carves a sentence onto the prisoner’s arm before 
letting him die. The device has fallen out of favour with the new com-
mandant of the penal colony. Nostalgic for this old brand of justice, 
the officer lobbies the new commandant to reverse his decision and 
reinstate the machine. His efforts unsuccessful, the officer puts himself 
in the machine and is impaled. The way in which the officer describes 
the physical appearance of the machine reveals that his affinity for 
it has as much to do with aesthetics as ideology. As Danielle Allen 
writes, “The officer’s gestures establish a context for judging his beloved 
Commandant’s apparatus: it should be viewed, or read, as a work of art” 
(327). In his fetishizing of the aesthetic, the officer is like Kildare. The 
technological allure and absolutism of the torture device override even 
Colin McDougall 177
the most basic forms of human decency. Kafka’s correspondence with 
Max Brod shows that Kafka had read Fear and Trembling before writing 
“In the Penal Colony” and “felt that Kierkegaard’s writing deepened his 
own understanding of ethical individualism” (Heidsieck 134).
Kafka’s officer does not have to “acquiesce” to execution because 
he believes it to “be just” every time, but the Canadian troops in Italy 
do not have this luxury because they cannot fully give themselves over 
to the military. The fact that they were performing an order is of little 
comfort. Bazin may be the commandant of a prison, but he is noth-
ing like the officer. Indeed, he refers to “this Strafekolonie [sic] . . . 
[as] a minor beach-head of hell” (153). Bazin, moreover, recognizes the 
artifice behind Kildare’s persona, the image of “Ian Kildare, recovered 
from his wounds, and now apparently the darling of Canada since the 
newspapers told of his gallant charge to the bagpipes” (153). Kildare’s 
heroism at the Hitler Line, as the reader knows, was at least part per-
formance. His bagpiper was a Jewish soldier named Cohen, not a Scot 
named Fergus. He, like Brazin, lacks the officer’s sureness of purpose: 
“Both men were actors. They had created a rare character role between 
them: that of laird and gillie; and now Brigadier Kildare wanted to see 
if Fergus would play his part to the end” (137). 
Kildare is just as multifaceted as the other soldiers in the novel. It 
is, indeed, a testament to McDougall’s skills and depth as a writer that 
even his lesser characters are complex. His name may betray Kildare as 
a Waugh-like military caricature, but he is decidedly three-dimensional. 
He struggles against the execution even if he must, in the end, acqui-
esce to it. He vehemently opposes charging the Hitler Line, believing 
it to be a suicide mission, before eventually relenting to his superiors. 
He makes a crucial misjudgment of Jones but promotes Adam, a fine 
leader, while firing Dodd, an incompetent one. He agrees to commute 
Jones’s sentence but is overruled by his superiors. His charge at the 
Hitler Line, with its accompanying bagpipes, is emblematic of his char-
acter. He is part sincerity and part performance. For Webb, “Kildare is 
in the same position as the men under him: bound to carry out orders, 
no matter how unethical they might be, yet determined to preserve 
whatever shreds of humanity remain available to him” (173). It is this 
sophisticated view of military authority that differentiates Execution 
from previously anti-authoritarian Canadian war novels like Generals 
Die in Bed or Turvey (1951).
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Major Bazin’s Kafkaesque time as a military prison guard fore-
shadows Jones’s captivity after Jones is implicated in the murder of an 
American soldier. Adam worries, “What would happen to Jones in a 
Field Punishment Camp?” (153). He does not have to wait long before 
Jones is confronting his own execution without knowing why. The ser-
geant assigned to hold Jones is unable to reconcile the double meaning 
of execution either: “Up north, men were being killed every day; their 
life was regarded as precious; every effort was made to preserve each 
life — but back here this band of soldiers was assembled for the sole 
purpose of killing one of their number. Like all the others he could not 
help feeling it was wrong, in some basic, indefinable way” (226). It is 
hard not to read these lines as an indictment of the Canadian military 
for the execution of Private Harold Pringle.
The time immediately after the sacrifice of Jones is one of contem-
plation and restored faith. Adam says, “I don’t know why but I feel 
alright now. And yet, I thought — I believed — when the execution 
was over everything would be over” (260). Adam is one with humanity: 
“Today he felt himself to exist at the central suffering of all humanity. 
He was filled with a huge compassion and love and understanding for 
every man who had ever lived” (269). Having failed to see God on the 
battlefield with the True Cross, Padre Doorn returns to God cured of 
the selfish hypocrisy that plagued him at the beginning of the novel: 
“It seemed to Adam that the Padre looked younger. Why, he looks like 
a man of God again, Adam thought, one who has been away, and has 
at last returned” (263). This restoration of faith in God for Doorn and 
personal regeneration for Adam are the gifts Jones gives them through 
sacrifice.
In Kierkegaard’s reading of the story of Abraham and Isaac, 
Abraham has enough faith to trust that God would not make him 
kill his son, although he is prepared to do so. In Execution, the char-
acters also have their faith tested: Padre Doorn has his religious faith 
tested, while Adam’s faith in the structure of the military is tested. 
Adam teleologically suspends his ethical code when he decides to give 
up his quest to free Jones in order to provide comfort to him in his 
final hours: “He saw that there was only one possible course of action: 
and that was to stay with Jones until the end, and envelop him with a 
cocoon of protection” (251). Major Bazin similarly laments, “Perhaps it 
is man’s plight to acquiesce” (115). This concept of acquiescence stands 
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in for Kierkegaard’s concept of the leap of faith. Bazin, for instance, 
concludes that recognizing your own acquiescence might be enough to 
save your soul: “even recognizing execution as the evil may be victory 
of sorts; struggling against it may be the closest man ever comes to vic-
tory” (115). Unlike with Isaac, no angel interferes on behalf of Jones; 
he must die because it is not enough, as Bazin hopes, to recognize one’s 
own compromises.
Ultimately, Execution examines whether it is possible to follow orders 
ethically. The command structure of the military is predicated upon 
an equivocation of responsibility: one must simply do as one is com-
manded. For soldiers, whose sole reason for being is to follow orders, 
“execution” goes beyond capital punishment to represent a state of 
being. Novak writes that, in the most sophisticated war novels, a “con-
stant tension exists within the individual’s consciousness as he attempts 
to come to terms with his role as a soldier” (97). This tension results in 
an increasing isolation both from “the cause for which he is fighting and 
from his own moral identity” (97). In Eichmann in Jerusalem, another 
existentialist, Hannah Arendt, insists that moral choice remains even 
under oppressive structures such as the military or totalitarianism: 
[U]nder conditions of terror most people will comply but some 
people will not, just as the lesson of the countries to which the Final 
Solution was proposed is that ‘it could happen’ in most places but 
it did not happen everywhere. (135)
Given Arendt’s reasoning, the age-old equivocation, “I was just follow-
ing orders,” is wholly insufficient.
Kierkegaard’s second premise, the conflation of God and love, is evi-
dent in Adam’s curious interaction with an Italian sex worker while on 
leave. Set adrift and numbed by the execution of the two Italians, Adam 
strives to follow orders and does not engage his moral consciousness 
until an encounter with an Italian prostitute, Elena, in the town of Bari. 
Adam repeats “Io ti amo” to Elena in order to prevent her from feeling 
like a commodity, and these words have a significant impact on him as 
well: “It was pretence, but he had given her something; and, oddly, he 
felt better at once as though he had also given something to himself” 
(102). He continues, “Io ti amo. . . . He knew they meant something of 
immense significance; at this moment they were the only words in the 
world that mattered” (102). His encounter with Elena shocks Adam out 
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of the cycle of denial: “There was only one difference in his state before 
and after Bari. Now he was aware of the emptiness inside him: and he 
knew that not all his competence, nor all his passion of concern for the 
men of his Company, would ever suffice to fill it” (108). His declara-
tion in Bari is pure performance — the performance of love — but 
it has a profound impact on him. In this episode, McDougall evokes 
Pascal’s formula for belief: “Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and 
you will believe” (Althusser 114). Ideologies are lived as much as they 
are known. Performing the ritual of love has a genuine effect on Adam 
and on Elena. Love insinuates itself into his identity through pretense 
and performance.
The key word in the exchange between Elena and Adam is amo: love. 
His encounter with the Italian sex worker is problematic but, neverthe-
less, accords with Kierkegaard’s philosophy. For Kierkegaard, the act of 
loving is the closest any individual can get to the divine. While Padre 
Doorn attempts to approach God by retrieving the True Cross, Adam 
has more success through the illusion of love. Bazin also recognizes 
the power of love, even if this realization comes too late to save him: 
“There was less in him to change: he had lost his saints when he was 
very young; long ago he had made his compromises” (50). He cynically 
conjugates the verb to love as he fires at the enemy: “‘Amo’ said Major 
Bunny Bazin, snapping the bolt of his rif le closed. ‘I love’ . . . ‘Amas’ 
. . . ‘You love’” (109). And he asks Adam, “Tell me, do you know any 
better way of passing the afternoon than to lie at ease sniping at the 
enemy, while conjugating the verb ‘to love,’ and drinking the best issue 
Egyptian rum? Hell, it’s the vocation I’ve been searching for all my 
life” (110). Yet, although Bazin may have given in to cynicism, he still 
encourages Adam: “Maybe you found something in Bari — something 
stronger than the other thing. Whatever it was, hang on to it — believe 
in it” (116). This statement is Bazin’s tacit confession that his way of 
coping with the random brutality of war may not be the only way. 
Love may be another way. Thanks to Adam, even Bazin is optimistic: 
“Amabo, amabis, amabit. . . . We’ll love in all the future inflexions too” 
(109).
While Padre Doorn’s search for the True Cross and Adam’s dec-
laration of love accord with the first two premises of Kierkegaard’s 
Christian existentialism, the execution of Jones is congruous with 
Kierkegaard’s third premise: the undoing of evil acts. Jones’s execution 
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functions in much the same way as the performance of love between 
Elena and Adam. As Cariou observes, it is a “ceremonial performance 
Adam creates in order to transform the act of execution from the most 
vicious, pointless slaughter to something else. . . . The execution is 
really a ritual of love, in which amo becomes ammo, and Jones becomes 
a Christ-like figure who does not die in vain because the ceremony 
of his death enables the moral salvation of others” (277). It comes as 
no surprise when, after Jones’s execution, Adam observes that each of 
the Canadian soldiers “was changed, in a sense, perhaps, restored to 
whatever they had been before Sicily” (263). The “vulture fear” that 
had haunted Adam leaves him as well when he observes a “large bird, 
wings a-whirr, shot from its branch, and went speeding in a tight spiral 
to the top of the sky; it became a black dot, and then it disappeared” 
(27). Jones provides what Ronald Sutherland calls “the vital pretense,” 
by which those witnessing his bureaucratic execution are able to achieve 
some sort of victory (28).
On the same day that Kierkegaard published Fear and Trembling, he 
also published the comic philosophical novel Repetition (1843), in which 
he makes the case for repetition: “Repetition is an indestructible gar-
ment that fits closely and tenderly, neither binds nor sags. . . . [R]epeti-
tion is a beloved wife of whom one never wearies, for one only becomes 
weary of what is new. One never grows weary of the old, and when 
one has that, one is happy” (4). The broad question Repetition poses is 
how meaning in life can be regained after a great trauma. Kierkegaard 
argues that a sense of peace can be achieved through repetition and re-
enactment, provided one is able to learn from his or her repetitions and 
strive for epiphany.
McDougall, a veteran who strove to purge himself of his war experi-
ence through writing, was understandably drawn to these philosophical 
questions. Kierkegaard scholar Edward F. Mooney writes, “Repetition 
is epiphany that sometimes grants the old again, as new, and sometimes 
grants something radically new” (viii). This is how, within the com-
plex paradigm of the novel, it is somehow possible for one execution to 
atone for another. Repeating past behaviour can yield new knowledge 
provided those involved do not lapse into intellectual and ethical lazi-
ness, as Adam and Doorn do after the first execution. Jones’s death is 
different from the execution of the Italians because the characters closest 
to the act, Adam and Doorn, are different. They no longer try to stifle 
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their culpability with competence or trinkets but rather strive for honest 
epiphany. Therefore, McDougall’s project is the same as Kierkegaard’s 
and, indeed, Faulkner’s. McDougall repeats the same story again and 
again as Kierkegaard does with the parable of Abraham and Isaac, not 
to suggest a vicious cycle of recidivism, but in order to find new direc-
tions from old. Hopefully, critics of this often-overlooked novel will do 
the same and strive for new interpretations in order to deliver to readers 
what the novel also promises — regeneration and renewal.
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